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Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America): Do U.S.
Commercial Treaties Provide Foreign
Corporations with an Immunity from U.S.
Civil Rights Laws?
The recent federal district court ruling in Spiess v. C Itoh & Co.
(America), Inc. I raised novel questions about the application of U.S. civil
rights laws to foreign-owned companies operating in the United States.
The Spiess court considered the assertion by a Japanese-owned subsidiary
that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Japan2 provided Japanese companies operating in the
United States with the absolute right to hire employees "of their
choice,"'3 irrespective of U.S. antidiscrimination laws. 4 Upon examining
the Treaty, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
denied the subsidiary's motion to dismiss, finding that any immunity
which might exist did not extend to a foreign subsidiary incorporated
under the laws of the United States.5 Shortly after the ruling in Spiess,
federal district courts in Avig/hano v. Sumitomo Shoi America, Inc. 6 and Lin-
skey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. 7 decided substantially the same question.
Together with opinions expressed by the Department of State, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Treaty negotiators,8
these decisions present myriad interpretations of the same treaty provi-
sions.9
I 469 F. Supp. I (S.D. Tex. 1979).
2 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
3 "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the terri-
tories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attor-
neys, agents, and other specialists of their choice. ... Id., art. VIII, para. 1.
4 469 F. Supp. at 2.
5 Id. The court was ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss. The decision was certified
for immediate appeal.
6 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd on rehearing, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 580
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
7 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
8 See text accompanying notes 45-65 infa.
9 The Japanese Treaty is one of more than 25 commercial treaties involving the United
States, containing the exact or substantially similar provisions. Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern,
Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1185. While the treaties are often labelled "commercial," the subject
matter extends to certain commitments in international law, such as national treatment and
most favored nation treatment. Wilson, Post War Commercial Treaties ofthe United States, 43 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 262, 264 (1947). Although the "right to choice" provisions in these treaties are not
identical, they vary only in the specific employee positions which they name. Because there is
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Plaintiffs in Sptiess alleged that their employer, Itoh-America, en-
gaged in racially discriminatory employment practices1 ° in violation of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"1 and 42 U.S.C. section 1981.12
For its defense, 13 Itoh-America relied on article VIII(l) of the 1953
Treaty, which provides that "[n]ationals and companies of either Party
shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party,
[managerial personnel] of their choice."' 14 As a wholly-owned subsidiary
of a Japanese corporation, Itoh-America claimed that this provision insu-
lated it from federal review of its employment practices. 15 Plaintiffs,
however, argued that if such an absolute right existed at all, it extended
only to the hiring practices of the Japanese corporation and not to those
of its U.S. subsidiary.16
The court did not address whether foreign corporations under the
Treaty do in fact enjoy any exemption from U.S. employment discrimi-
nation laws. Instead, the court concluded that Itoh-America was a U.S.
corporation for article VIII(l) purposes and, consequently, was not enti-
tled to invoke such a right even if it did exist. 17 The court based this
conclusion on article XXII(3) of the Treaty's definitional section, which
provides that "[c]ompanies constituted under the applicable laws and
regulations within the territories of either party shall be deemed companies
thereof.' 18 Because Itoh-America was incorporated under the laws of
New York, it was a U.S. corporation by treaty definition and, therefore,
no indication that these various provisions were intended to have disparate applications, the
interpretation of article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty should apply generally to the other
treaties as well. These treaties, which contain provisions similar to those which are discussed in
this note, are listed in part in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 historical note (1970).
10 469 F. Supp. at 1. For a discussion of the possible causes of action and defenses arising
in regard to a company hiring only citizens of a foreign country see Schwartz, Commercial Treaties
and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case ofJapanese Employees, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947 (1979).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
12 Id. § 1981.
13 469 F. Supp. at 1.
14 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII, para. 1.
15 Id. at 2. Itoh-America supported this proposition by pointing to article I, which autho-
rizes Japanese corporations to organize branches, affiliates, and subsidiaries, and article VII
which authorizes and facilitates the entry of Japanese nationals into the United States to carry
on trade or direct operations of a Japanese investment. According to Itoh-America, these arti-
cles, in connection with article VIII(l), accorded Japanese employers the absolute right to hire
Japanese managerial personnel of their choice to staff their locally incorporated subsidiaries. Id.
at 3.
16 Id. Plaintiffs further contended that the purpose of article VIII(l) was "to prevent the
imposition of ultranationalistic policies with respect to employment and not [to] shield them."
Consequently, the court should look to United Nations Charter provisions "which supersede
conflicting treaty provisions and state that all members pledge themselves to promote freedom
for all without distinction of race." Id. Although the Spiess court did not find it necessary to
reach this issue, it seems doubtful that plaintiffs would prevail on these grounds. Such provi-
sions of the U.N. Charter are usually considered general standards or goals, rather than specific
mandates, and courts are reluctant to adjudicate areas involving sensitive ideological and politi-
cal goals in the absence of a legislative mandate. United States v. Vargas, 370 F. Supp. 908, 915
(D.P.R. 1974); see also Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17 469 F. Supp. at 3.
18 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII, para. 3 (emphasis added).
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was subject to the laws of the United States. 19
The court cited only United States v. R.P. Oldham Co .20 in support of
its finding that Itoh-America was a U.S. corporation. In Oldham a whol-
ly owned U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese corporation was indicted for anti-
trust violations.2 ' As a defense, the subsidiary argued that article
XV111 22 of the Treaty denied the federal court jurisdiction by providing
the exclusive remedy for such violations. 23 The U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California rejected this defense basing its ruling
on the definitional terms of article XVIII(3).24 The court determined
that "by the terms of the Treaty itself. . . a corporation organized under
the laws of a given jurisdiction, is a creature of that jurisdiction, with no
greater rights, privileges, or immunities than any other corporation of
that jurisdiction. ' 25 Thus, any protection the Treaty might afford
against the application of U.S. laws would extend only to Japanese cor-
porations, and not to their U.S. subsidiaries. The Oldham court noted
that the subsidiary could have retained its status as a Japanese corpora-
tion by operating through a branch; instead, the company had chosen to
surrender its Japanese identity to gain the privileges accorded U.S. cor-
porati6ns. 26
Despite the conclusion in Oldham that nationality is determined by
the place of incorporation, Itoh-America contended that it retained its
Japanese identity by virtue of Department of State immigration guide-
lines and regulations. 27 These regulations, 28 adopted in connection with
article 129 of the Treaty, authorize an alien employee of a company hav-
ing the nationality of a treaty country to enter the United States under
"treaty trader" status. For these purposes, the nationality of the employ-
ing firm is determined by the nationality of the majority of stockhold-
ers. 30 Because Itoh-America is wholly owned by Japanese interests, it is a
Japanese corporation for admissions purposes under article I. Therefore
Itoh-America urged that it should be considered a Japanese corporation
19 469 F. Supp. at 4.
20 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
21 Id.
22 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XVIII, para. 1. Article XVIII states:
The two Parties agree that business practices which restrain competition, limit
access to markets or foster monopolistic control, and which are engaged in or
made effective by one or more private or public commercial enterprises or by
combination, agreement or other arrangement among such enterprises, may have
harmful effects upon commerce between their respective territories. Accordingly,
each Party agrees upon the request of the other party to consult with respect to
measures as it deems appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects.
23 152 F. Supp. at 822.
24 Id at 823.
25 Id
26 Id
27 469 F. Supp. at 5-6.
28 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1980).
29 See note 2 supra.
30 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL PART II, quoted in part in 469 F.
Supp. at 6.
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for purposes of article VIII(1) as well.a' According to Itoh-America, the
freedom of choice provision should be interpreted as interacting with ar-
ticle I so as to permit U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese corporations to fill
their managerial positions with Japanese nationals of their choice, to be
admitted to this country under treaty trader status. The court, however,
while recognizing "that nationality is determined by a different standard
for other purposes," concluded that resort to the treaty trader regulations
was "unwarranted in the face of the clear definitional provisions of arti-
cle XXII(3). '32
Once persuaded that a domestic subsidiary is not a company of Ja-
pan for article VIII(l) purposes, and, consequently, enjoys no direct pro-
tection under that provision, the Spiess court focused on whether the
subsidiary nonetheless has standing to assert the article VIII(l) rights of
its foreign parent.3 3 In support of this argument, Itoh-America cited
Calnetics Corporation v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 34 In Calnetics, the Ninth
Circuit permitted a U.S. subsidiary of a German corporation to chal-
lenge the lower court's imposition of an import ban on the grounds that
the ban adversely affected the treaty rights of its foreign parent.35 Itoh-
America argued that Calnetics supported the proposition that a subsidi-
ary incorporated in the United States enjoys the same rights as its foreign
parent.36 The Spiess court rejected this interpretation and, instead,
found that Calnetics asserted that a subsidiary has standing to raise a for-
eign parent's treaty rights only for the foreign parent. 37 Any discussion
of standing in Spiess would be moot, as the hiring practice of Itoh-
America, not that of its parent corporation, was in issue.38
The Spiess court reasoned that a treaty interpretation which gave
Itoh-America the same rights as its foreign parent would be inconsistent
with the overall purpose of the Treaty to encourage mutually beneficial
trade and investment by guaranteeing national treatment to foreign
businesses. 39 Indeed, the Treaty generally assures nationals and compa-
nies of each country the same legal rights and duties as the nationals and
companies of their host nation enjoy. The Spiess court found that the
"tenor of the entire Treaty" was to extend equal rather than better treat-
ment. 4° The court reasoned that while Itoh-America, as a domestic sub-
sidiary, "cannot claim whatever benefit article VIII(l) was designed to
31 469 F. Supp. at 6.
32 Id.
33 Id at 7.
34 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
35 Id at 693.
36 469 F. Supp. at 8.
37 Id. at 9.
38 Id
39 Id at 6. The Treaty's preface states that the purpose of the Treaty is to promote "mu-
tually beneficial investments by establishing mutual rights and privileges. . . based in general
upon principles of national and most-favored nation treatment." Treaty, supra note 2, preface.
40 469 F. Supp. at 7 (quoting United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. at 823).
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convey, it can claim the most important right conveyed by the Treaty-




It should be noted that in a limited number of areas the Treaty
clearly accords less than national treatment. For example, article VII(3)
of the Treaty permits each party to prescribe "special formalities in con-
nection with the establishment of alien-controlled enterprises within its
territories; but such formalities may not impair" the general right of
these enterprises to engage in business. 42 Another provision, article
VII(2), gives the parties the right to limit the extent of alien interests in
specific sensitive enterprises such as public utilities, banking, and ship-
building. 43 The issue left unanswered by Spiess, however, is whether in a
further limited respect the Treaty grants better than national treat-
ment 44 -that is, whether article VIII(l) provides foreign corporations
the right to hire managerial personnel without regard to the host nation's
employment laws. By concluding that Itoh-America neither enjoyed di-
rect protection under article VIII(l) nor had any standing to invoke
whateyer rights its foreign parent enjoyed, the Spiess court avoided this
critical question.
Shortly after Spiess, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, in Av'gh'ano v. Sumitomo Sho" America, Inc ., 4 5 considered the
identical question of whether the Treaty provides foreign subsidiaries in-
corporated in the United States with an absolute right to hire managerial
personnel of their choice. Relying extensively on Spiess, the Av'gh'ano
court found that no such right exists.4 Except for a discussion concern-
ing the treaty trader guidelines and brief references to the lack of perti-
nent legislative history, the Avi'h;ano court, like the court in Spiess,
seldom looked beyond the terms of the Treaty to support its interpreta-
tions. On reargument, 4 7 however, the Avikliano court was asked to re-
examine the terms of the Treaty in light of several State Department
41 1d at 6.
42 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII, para. 3. According to Herman Walker, Jr., a principal
formulator of these treaties, however, the provision was less a prohibitive restriction than a
circumvention of "legislation technically at variance with the principle in respect of such mate-
rially inconsequential matters as citizenship requirements for the signers of the articles of incor-
poration or for certain members of the board of directors." Walker, Iirovirwns of Compantes n US
Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L. L. 373, 387 (1956).
43 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII, para. 2.
44 According to negotiator Herman Walker, the standard of national treatment "is set
forth in general terms so as to comprehend the whole range of factors affecting the competitive
position of the foreign company in relation to the domestic company. But separate provisions
deal with special subjects of taxation, of employment of personnel and of real property. . . . In
the matter of employment, provisions have been developed technically going beyond national
treatment, to prevent the imposition of ultranationalistic policies with respect to essential execu-
tive and technical personnel." Walker, supra note 42, at 385-86.
45 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
461d
47 Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 580 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), afg, 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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documents. 48 It is for this examination that Avigh'ano is most noteworthy.
The documents released by the State Department consisted of the
negotiating record of the Treaty, 49 a recent memorandum examining the
meaning of article XXII(3),5° and contemporaneous statements by nego-
tiators of this and similar treaties. 5' In sum, these documents support the
proposition that article XXII(3) was intended by the negotiators as sim-
ply a procedural test for establishing the legal status and nationality of a
company, rather than one affecting application of the Treaty's substan-
tive rights. 52 The documents argue that the only purpose of "the place of
incorporation" definition is to "avoid such complex questions as the law
to be applied" in determining whether or not to recognize an organiza-
tion as having company status.53 Under this interpretation, although a
Japanese-owned domestic subsidary receives its juridical status in the
United States via article XXII(3), it is still considered an investment by a
Japanese company for purposes of the Treaty's substantive rights.54
The documents also suggest a more significant role within the
scheme of the Treaty for the treaty trader regulations. One U.S. negotia-
tor stated in a dispatch that Japanese employees with treaty trader status
were not free to resign from Japanese firms to seek employment else-
where in the United States.55 It was possible, however, for an employee
"to leave one Japanese branch firm to work for an affiliate or subsidiary
of that firm."' 56 The Japanese-owned subsidiary in Avigliano argued that
this language demonstrated that the negotiators did not intend to distin-
guish between branches and subsidiaries as to the employment of treaty
48 Id at 581-85.
49 Dispatch from Jules Bassin, Legal Attache to American Embassy in Tokyo, to Mikizo
Nagai, Chief, Sixth Section, Economic Affairs Bureau, Memorandum of Conversation from the
Office of the United States Postal Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, Dispatch No. 13 (April 8, 1952),
quotedin Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 582-85 [herein-
after cited as Dispatch No. 13].
50 Department of State Airgram to the American Embassy in Tokyo, signed "Kissinger"
(Jan. 9, 1976), reprinted tn Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
at 582 [hereinafter cited as Kissinger Airgram].
51 Department of State Instruction No. A-852 to HICOG, Bonn (January 21, 1954), quoted
in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583 [hereinafter
cited as Instruction No. A-852]; Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2529 from HICOG, Bonn, to
Department of State (March 18, 1954), quoted in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583.
52 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583.
53 Id
54 Id. This interpretation is consistent with another of Mr. Walker's articles in which he
states:
Normally and classically, a country extends diplomatic protection abroad for ob-
jects which are, and because they are, juridically identified with it. . . Here,
however, treaty protection is gained for entities not so identified; the "corporate
veil is pierced" for the purpose of making economic interest, rather than legal
relationship, the justification and the basis for protection.
Walker, Treatiesfor the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: 1resent United States Prc-
tice, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229, 233 (1956).
55 Dispatch No. 13, supra note 49, at 4, quoted in 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583.
56 Id
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trader employees under the Treaty.5" Indeed, another negotiator to a
similar commercial treaty 58 stated:
There is no intent to attempt to regulate the particular form of business
entity by which the desired trading activities are to be carried on ...
The important consideration is not whether the corporate employer is
domestic or alien as to juridical status. The controlling factors are, in-
stead: ...(b) whether it is a "foreign organization" in the sense that
the control thereof is vested in nationals of the other treaty country, the
customary test being whether or not a majority of the stock is held by
such nationals; and (c) whether the individual ...is duly qualified for
status as a treaty trader.
59
This evidence clearly raises questions about the Spziss court's interpreta-
tion of article XXII(3).
In addition to these documents, the Atgvik'no court was also asked to
consider the contrary view of the State Department as expressed in an
opinion letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 60 In
an earlier view, which had been considered and rejected in both SpZss 6 '
and Avig/tano,62 the State Department had expressed the opinion that
there were no grounds for distinguishing between the branches of a for-
eign parent and its domestic subsidiaries.63 Now, reversing its earlier po-
sition, the State Department argued that "after an extensive review of
the negotiating files [it had] established that the U.S. subsidiaries of Jap-
57 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583.
58 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Federal
Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
59 Instruction No. A-852, supra note 51, at 1, quoted in 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583.
60 Letter from James R. Atwood, Department of State Deputy Legal Advisor to Lutz
Alexander Prager, EEOC Assistant General Counsel (Sept. 11, 1979), reprinted in Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 581 [hereinafter cited as Atwood
Letter].
61 469 F. Supp. at 10-11.
62 473 F. Supp. at 510-11.
63 Id at 511. The State Department expressed this view in response to questions posed to
it by the EEOC, which submitted an amicus curiae brief in opposition to Sumitomo's motion to
dismiss. In response to the question, "[D]oes the treaty permit subsidiaries of Japanese compa-
nies which are organized under the laws of a state of the United States to fill all its management
positions with Japanese nationals admitted as treaty traders?" the State Department stated:
The phrase "of their choice" should be interpreted to give effect to [the in-
tention that the United States companies operating in Japan could hire United
States personnel for critical positions, and vice versa], and we therefore believe
that Article VIII(l) permits U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies to fill all of
their "executive personnel" positions with Japanese nationals admitted to this
country as treaty traders.
To the question, "[I]s the situation different if the company doing business in the United
States is not incorporated in the United States?" the State Department replied:
[W]e see no grounds for distinguishing between subsidiaries incorporated in
the United States owned and controlled by a Japanese company and those oper-
ating as unincorporated branches of a Japanese company, nor do we see any pol-
icy reasons for making the applicability of Article VIII dependent on a choice of
organizational form.
Letter from Lee P. Marks, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Abner W. Sibal,
General Counsel EEOC (Oct. 17, 1978), quoted in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,
473 F. Supp. at 511.
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anese corporations cannot avail themselves of [article VIII(I)]."64 In-
stead, their rights "are determined by the general provisions . . .which
provide for national [treatment]. 65
Before considering either the State Department documents or the
agency's own interpretation of article VIII(l), the Avighano court recog-
nized several well-established principles of legal construction. The
Supreme Court has ruled that while courts interpret treaties for them-
selves, "the meaning given them by the departments of government par-
ticularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great
weight."'66 Yet, courts are "not required to abdicate what is basically a
judicial function and must give all parts of a treaty . . .a reasonable
construction, with a view to giving a fair operation to the whole."'6 7 In
applying these principles, the Avighzano court concluded that the State
Department letter was of little aid because it offered no authority or rea-
soning in support of its position.68 This was the same criticism which led
the Spiess and Avikhano courts to reject the view of the first opinion let-
ter;69 yet, the State Department again failed to support its position.
70
The court undoubtedly questioned the source of the Department's rea-
soning because "[t]he documents raise[d] doubt about the intent of the
negotiators on the narrow question before the court."
7
'
Therefore, despite the new documentary evidence presented to it,
the Avigh'ano court affirmed its earlier decision by resorting to a "plain
term reading" of the Treaty. 72 The court noted that in articles VI(4)
and VII(l) and (4), the drafters extended national treatment to "enter-
prises in which nationals and companies . ..have a substantial inter-
est," while in the critical article VIII(l), rights were granted only to
"nationals and companies. '73 This language demonstrated that the
"drafters knew how to give locally incorporated subsidiaries rights under
specific articles."' 74 Thus, the court reasoned that the drafters intention-
64 Atwood Letter, supra note 60, reprinted in 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 581.
65 Id The plaintiff and the EEOC also referred "to other Department of State documents
for the proposition that the Treaty negotiators did not seek to give foreign companies greater
rights than those accorded domestic companies, but rather to ensure national treatment by
barring employment discrimination against aliens," 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583. E.g., For-
eign Service Dispatch No. 2529 from HICOG, Bonn, to Department of State (March 18, 1954),
cited in Id
66 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1960).
67 Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation, 242 F. Supp. 129, 136 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
68 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 584.
69 See 469 F. Supp. at 11; 473 F. Supp. at 511-12.
70 The State Department clearly was aware of both of these holdings and even referred to
them in the opinion letter. See Atwood Letter, supra note 60, reprinted in 21 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. at 581.
71 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 584.
72 Id at 585.
73 Id
74 Id
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ally omitted subsidiaries from article VIII(l). 75 Consequently, the court
looked to the article XXII(3) definitional provision to define "nationals
and companies" and thereby excluded locally incorporated subsidiar-
ies.76 The Avigh'ano court concluded that the ambiguity and doubt raised
by the documents could not escape this plain-term meaning.
7 7
The Spiess court pursued a similar line of "plain term" reasoning in
relying on article VI(3) and section 2 of the Protocol to support its hold-
ing against Itoh-America. 78 Article VI(3) provides compensation to "na-
tionals and companies" when their property is expropriated for a public
purpose. 79 According to the article XXII(3) definition, this protection
would not extend to a subsidiary like Itoh-America because it is a com-
pany of the United States. In what the court termed an "obvious at-
tempt to extend this protection to such entities," section 2 of the Protocol
was adopted to extend compensation to "interests held directly or indi-
rectly by nationals and companies." 80 The court reasoned that "[ilf indi-
rect interests, e.g., subsidiaries like Itoh-America, were considered foreign
corporations for [Treaty purposes], the addition of § 2 of the Protocol
would have been redundant." 8 1
Both of these "plain term" readings of the Treaty necessarily assume
that by "enterprises in which nationals and companies have a substantial
interest" 82 and by "interests held directly or indirectly, '83 drafters were
referring to locally incorporated subsidiaries, such as Itoh-America. Her-
man Walker, Jr., a principal formulator of these treaties, disputes this
interpretation. According to Mr. Walker, the drafters instead were at-
tempting to assure that nationals and companies of a party-nation who
held interests in a company of a third nationality enjoyed the substantive
rights of national treatment and compensation.8 4 Thus, for example, a
Japanese company with interests in a foreign corporation of a third na-
tionality which operates in this country would be guaranteed the right to
compensation for whatever of its "fractional or intermediary" interests
were expropriated by the United States.85 If Mr. Walker's interpretation
is correct, then the "plain term" logic of Spiess and Avigliano is clearly in
error.
The Spiess court's holding that a domestic subsidiary does not have
standing to assert the article VIII(l) rights of its foreign parent in its own




78 469 F. Supp. at 7.
79 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI, para. 3.
80 Id. Protocol.
81 469 F. Supp. at 2.
82 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI, para. 4.
83 Id Protocol, para. 2.
84 Walker, supra note 42, at 388-89.
85 Id.
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plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury," and
the "interest to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interest
to be protected or regulated by the [law] in question."'86 Itoh-America
might allege that it is economically injured when prevented from hiring
specialized personnel of its choice and that this right is within the zone of
interest to be protected by the Treaty, and specifically by article VIII(l).
Indeed, in a treaty designed to encourage foreign investment, the right of
choice provision conceivably might guarantee foreign corporations the
right to hire employees in whom they have the most confidence for their
essential top-level positions. 87 The Spiess court, however, avoided such
an analysis by simply concluding that the foreign parent "has no Article
VIII(l) right to staff Itoh-America."'8
An interesting analogy to the situation in Spiess appears in Title VII
cases involving domestic parent corporations and subsidiaries. The trend
in recent cases in this area has been to inquire whether the parent and
subsidiary are so closely related that the parent can be treated as an "em-
ployer" for Title VII purposes and, therefore, be held liable for employ-
ment discrimination violations committed by the subsidiary.8 9 A few
86 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970); accord, Siman v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Commit-
tee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Indeed, Itoh-America
argued in Spiess that recent judicial authority liberalizing standing requirements had tacitly
overruled the holding in Oldham that a foreign-owned subsidiary incorporated in the United
States was a U.S. corporation and, consequently, had no standing to invoke rights which ex-
tended only to foreign corporations. 469 F. Supp. at 5.
87 The question may well be whether Title VII can be considered one of the discrimina-
tory burdens or harassments from which the Treaty intended to free foreign investors. If the
courts determine that the Treaty provides foreign investors with no exemption from Title VII,
however, U.S. investors abroad in turn would be subject to foreign laws regulating the employ-
ment of their managerial personnel, even where such laws are more prohibitive than Title VII.
Another problem which faces the courts is the lack of guidance as to the precise meaning of
the article VIII(l) terms "executive personnel," "other technical experts," and "other special-
ists." See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 950 n.19, 953 n.33.
88 469 F. Supp. at 9.
89 See, e.g., Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977); EEOC v.
Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ga. 1977). This approach has also been taken in cases
involving the Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III
1978). See, e.g., Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modihfd
608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Neb.
1973), afjd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974). Under this view, separate corporate entities can be
consolidated and considered a "single employer" if the court finds (1) interrelation of opera-
tions, (2) common management, (3) common control of labor relations, and (4) common owner-
ship or financial control. Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d at 392.
This view, however, is not universally followed. In Hassel v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), ajf'd, 454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), the court refused
to consider the parent corporation as the "employer" under Title VII where the subsidiary
corporation could in no way be called a sham. 336 F. Supp. at 433. The Hassel court noted that
the affairs of the two were handled separately, and that in legal contemplation, the two were
separate corporations, severally liable for purposes of debts and taxes. Id. The district court in
Armbruster v. Quinn, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1801 (E.D. Mich. 1980), elaborated on the
Hassel line of cases. The Armbrusler court found that the legislature intended the term "em-
ployer" to have its "common dictionary meaning" and to refer to the immediate company
which pays the employees' salaries, owns and operates the physical plant where the employees
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cases in the antitrust area have also ignored the subsidiary's separate le-
gal existence to treat the subsidiary as the alter ego of the parent. 90 A
subsidiary of a foreign parent conceivably might argue that such a ra-
tionale should be used to determine standing. Accordingly, if Itoh-
America could prove sufficiently that for practical purposes it and its
foreign parent corporation were one entity, it could argue that, because it
would be subject to the same liabilities as its parent corporation, it also
should have the same rights, including those granted by the Treaty.
Such an argument by Itoh-America, however, diminishes signifi-
cantly in strength when viewed in light of the policy considerations be-
hind the decision in the Title VII and antitrust cases. In the domestic
Title VII cases, the parent corporation and its subsidiary were treated as
the same entity in order to carry out the purpose of the Act to eliminate
racial discrimination. 9' In the antitrust area, while a few courts have
treated parent and subsidiary as the same entity to find liability,92 they
have refused to do so where such treatment would "save them from any
obligation that law imposes on separate entities. ' '93 Indeed, courts are
likely to treat parent corporations and their subsidiaries as the same en-
tity only where recognizing their separate legal existence will frustrate
the purposes of the particular law.94 In the Spiess situation, however,
recognizing Itoh-America and its foreign parent as one entity for the pur-
pose of standing to raise the article VIII(l) rights instead would frustrate
the purpose of Title VII. In defense, Itoh-America might argue that the
overall purpose of the Treaty is to encourage foreign investment, and
that this purpose, which is thwarted by distinguishing locally incorpo-
rated subsidiaries, outweighs the purposes furthered by Title VII in this
instance.
The district court in Linskey v. Heidberg Eastern, Inc. 9 actually re-
work, and manages the people and products of which the employees have personal knowledge.
Id at 1803. This analysis, the court held, was similar to "piercing the corporate veil" in the law
of corporations. Id The Armbruster court concluded that even using the most important factor
of the Baker test--centralized control of labor relations-the corporations were separate entities.
Id Applied to the facts in Spiess, the Hassel test might well support the conclusion by the Spiess
court that the foreign parent "has no Article VIII(l) right to staff Itoh-America," 469 F. Supp.
at 9.
90 E.g., Stotten & Co. v. Amstar Corp., 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978) (dealing with the Clay-
ton Act).
91 See, e.g., Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977); EEOC v.
Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ga. 1977). This approach has also been taken in cases
involving the Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III
1978), to further the purposes of that Act. See, e.g., Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modifed, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Neb. 1973), aJ'd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
92 Eg., Stotten & Co. v. Amstar Corp., 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978) (dealing with the Clay-
ton Act).
93 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142
(1968).
9 See, e.g., Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977); Marshall v.
Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); EEOC v. Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp.
635 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
95 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). It should be noted that Linskey was decided before
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sorted to the Title VII "employer test" in a case facing substantially the
same questions as those presented in Spiess and Avigh'ano.96 Instead of
using the test as a vehicle for granting an immunity, however, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York authorized its use to
establish the Title VII liability of the foreign parent corporation as well
as its locally incorporated subsidiary.9 7 To do so, of course, the court
addressed the threshold question avoided by the courts in Spzess and Avig-
h'ano: whether article VIII(l) in fact provides any immunity from Title
VII to any entity in any situation. 98
Upon reviewing the available legislative history, the Linskey court
concluded that the purpose of the provision was to exempt certain em-
ployees of foreign companies from the admission requirements of a host
country.99 This conclusion was based primarily upon a memorandum
by the New York City Bar Association submitted to a Senate subcommit-
tee reviewing a similar commercial treaty.10 0 The memorandum stated
that the provision was desirable because too restrictive admission re-
quirements impede the flow of trade.' 0 ' The court drew further support
for this conclusion from the legislative history10 2 of the 1967 Thailand
Treaty.' 0 3 Because the Thailand Treaty was ratified three years after
passage of Title VII, the court inferred that the absence of any discussion
of a possible conflict between the Treaty provision and Title VII indi-
cated that the provision was not intended as any kind of Title VII ex-
emption. 10 4 Moreover, the court cited the specific language in the
Thailand Treaty which provides that "[niationals and companies of ei-
ther Party shall be permitted, i'n accordance with applicable laws to engage
the reargument of Avtghano. Indeed, the Avigliano court mentions Linskey in a footnote, but
declines to "reach the issue of the substantive scope of the Treaty's employment rights." 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. at 585 n.2.
96 Although Linskey involves the commercial treaty between the United States and Den-
mark, the issues before the court were materially the same. Plaintiff was an employee of a U.S.-
incorporated subsidiary of another U.S. corporation. The latter was a subsidiary of a foreign
parent corporation incorporated under the laws of Denmark. Plaintiff brought suit against all
three corporations, alleging violations of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. The foreign parent corporation moved either to dismiss the complaint or for summary
judgment on the grounds that it was not the "employer" and that the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark expressly
exempted the foreign parent from the provisions of Title VII and ADEA. 470 F. Supp. at 1182-
83.
97 Id at 1184.
98 Id at 1184-85.
99 Id at 1186.
100 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Foreign Law, Comments
on the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States of America
and the Republic of Haiti on March 3, 1955, and Iran, on August 15, 1955 (1956), quoted in
Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1186.
1o 1d
102 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE COMMERCIAL TREATY
WITH THAILAND, S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967).
103 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand, May 26, 1966, United States-
Thailand, 23 U.S.T. 1158, T.I.A.S. No. 7378 [hereinafter cited as The Thailand Treaty].
104 470 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
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. . . [personnel] of their choice."' 10 5 The court reasoned that although
the term "applicable laws" did not refer to Title VII, it did refer to the
Nationality and Immigration Act of 1952106 and certain State Depart-
ment regulations, 10 7 which in conjunction allowed Thai nationals to
enter the United States under the favorable "treaty trader" classifica-
tion.'0 8 Therefore, the Linskey court concluded that "[w]hen read in
light of the applicable law of the host country, [the right of choice provi-
sion] becomes a vehicle for granting foreign nationals 'treaty trader' sta-
tus," and not an exemption to Title VII.' 0 9 In view of the fact that over
thirty commercial treaties with similar "right of choice" provisions were
in force, the court declared that "a different result would provide an un-
justified loophole with wide-ranging effects for the enforcement of Title
VII.,"1o
Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty does not contain the clause
"in accordance with applicable laws." The legislative history of the Jap-
anese Treaty, however, includes a tabular comparison of all the treaties
ratified up to that date."' This table incorporates the Danish Treaty
considered in Linskey as capturing the meaning of article VIII(l). Thus,
if Linsky is upheld with regard to the Danish Treaty, it would be unjusti-
fied to have reached a different result in Spiess with regard to the Japa-
nese Treaty.
In resolving the questions presented by these cases, the courts should
be mindful of another recognized canon of treaty interpretation. The
Supreme Court has emphasized that when a treaty is in conflict with a
subsequent act of Congress, every effort is made to uphold all obliga-
tions.'i2 When the two cannot be harmonized, however, the later in
time is to prevail.' 1 3 This rule of construction reflects the belief that the
"Constitution does not declare that the law so established shall never be
altered or repealed by Congress."' 14 Thus, while "the other nation may
have ground for complaint . . . every person is bound to obey the
law."' 15 This is true even though abrogation of the Treaty will adversely
105 The Thailand Treaty, supra note 103, art. IV, para. 6 (emphasis added). This provision
is the Thailand Treaty's analogue to article VIII(1) of the Japanese Treaty.
106 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(15)(E)(i) (1976).
107 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1980).
108 470 F. Supp. at 1187.
109 Id
110 Id
I Treaties of Friendshto, Commerce, and Navigation with Israel, Ethopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece,
Finland, Germany, andjapan. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-17 (1953).
112 See, e.g., Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291
U.S. 138, 160 (1934).
113 See, e.g., Akins v. United States, 551 F.2d 1222 (C.C.P.A. 1977); United States v. White,
508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(Trade Act superseding "national treatment" rights of Treaties of Friendship with Taiwan and
Korea).
114 Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 311 (1914).
115 Id
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affect U.S. relations with other countries which are parties to the Treaty.
When applied to the Spiess facts, this general principle might sug-
gest that while the 1953 Japanese Treaty should override any conflicts
with the Civil Rights Acts of 1866116 and 1870,117 the Treaty still is
subordinate to Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.118 Because
the rule applies only if an irreconcilable conflict exists, however, the
question is still primarily one of inferring congressional intent. As the
legislative history of Title VII is silent on its application to these com-
mercial treaties, the courts' decisions are likely to depend on its resolu-
tion in balancing the policies proscribing discrimination and promoting
foreign trade. As a practical matter, however, courts are not likely to rely
solely on this particular canon of treaty interpretation, as the results are
less than satisfying. Because some of these commercial treaties were in
fact adopted after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,119 such reliance would
lead to the unjustified practice of exempting some foreign employers
while not others, depending solely on the dates their respective treaties
were adopted.
The final disposition of Spiess must be reconciled with the decisions
in Avigh'ano and Linskey. Though all three cases ultimately hold against
the foreign-owned subsidiary, the courts' interpretations of the same
treaty provision are not entirely consistent. In Spiess, the court "in the
absence of statutory ambiguity," relied upon the "clear definition" pro-
vided in the treaty.1 20 The meaning of that definition is to equate na-
tionality with place of incorporation; yet, in light of the evidence
presented in 4vigh'ano, the intended scope and purpose of this definition
is critically in issue. Thus, in an inquiry "to give the specific words of a
treaty a meaning consistent with the genuine shared expectations of the
parties,"' 21 the Spiess court was content to look no further than the ex-
pressed terms of the Treaty, although these terms are not as unambigu-
ous as that court believed. Moreover, the court in Spiess avoided the
inevitable threshold question of whether an immunity exists at all-a
question answered in the negative by Lz'nskey in a holding based largely
on the silence of the legislative history of the treaties. 122
In truth, the courts are probably being asked to infer an intent that
did not exist. Accordingly, resolution of whether the commercial treaties
accord foreign parent corporations or their U.S.-incorporated subsidiar-
ies with an exemption from U.S. civil rights laws will ultimately be deter-
mined within the court's discretion. In making the decision, however,
two considerations should be emphasized. First, substantial evidence
116 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
117 Id. § 1981.
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000d-17 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
"19 Eg., The Thailand Treaty, supra note 103 (adopted on April 26, 1967).
120 469 F. Supp. at 7.
121 Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), aftd, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
122 See 470 F. Supp. at 1186.
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outside of the treaty supports the proposition that the article XXII(3)
definitional provision was intended by the negotiators to be only a proce-
dural test, rather than one affecting the application of the Treaty's sub-
stantive provisions. Second, the overall purpose of the Treaty
unequivocally was to extend equal treatment to foreign investors. Al-
lowing article VIII(l) to be used to exempt foreign corporations or their
U.S. subsidiaries from U.S. civil rights laws would be an extension of
more-than-equal treatment that could be viewed as providing "an unjus-
tified loophole" to avoid application of the principles of equal opportu-
nity. Before reaching a satisfactory decision, the courts must reconcile
these seemingly incongruous considerations.
The final resolution of these cases will have a profound impact both
in this country and abroad. The United States is currently a party to
over two dozen bilateral treaties containing similar "right of choice" pro-
visions.1 23 While the Sp/ess court addressed only the application of these
provisions to U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries, the provisions inevitably
will be invoked by the many foreign corporations which are not incorpo-
rated under U.S. laws, but which operate in this country under these
same commercial treaties through other corporate forms such as
branches or affiliates. Indeed, ifSpess is affirmed on this distinction be-
tween the U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries and the foreign parent, other
foreign employers could easily change the corporate forms of their busi-
nesses to enjoy the article VIII(l) immunity. With foreign investment
spiraling in this country,124 a significant number of employers and poten-
tial employees would be directly affected by such an absolute immunity.
By granting foreign employers an immunity against U.S. employment
discrimination laws, the court would not only be encouraging foreign
businesses to invest in the United States, but would also be promoting
privileged treatment for American investors abroad. On the other hand,
denying such an immunity would promote equality of opportunity. The
final resolution of the question of the scope of treaty protection afforded
foreign employers will reflect the extent of the United States' commit-
ment to end discrimination within its borders, as well as to promote
human rights abroad.' 25
--- CHARLES W. WILSON
123 See note 9 supra.
124 Direct foreign investment in the United States increased by more than 36% within three
years to reach $34.1 billion at the end of 1977. Foreign Managers Make a Hit with US Workers,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 1979, at 59. Japanese spending in particular is accelerating.
Japan Steps Up its "Iwamston"ofUS, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 11, 1978, at 57.
125 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 975-76.

